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STATE OF UTAH 
31:\'TE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 
) 
vs. ) 10638 
) 
SHERRILL CHESTNUT I III, ) 
) 
Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT CHESTNUT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
'l'his is a criminal proceeding in which the -
~fendants, Lindell Ray Newton and Sherrill 
~estnut, III, were charged with the crime of 
robbery in violation of Utah Code Annotated Sec-
~ion 76-51-1 (1953) by information signed by 
~oyd Dunnell, District Attorney, Grand County, 
~tah. 
-?--
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
3 i: 
The defendants were jointly tried bef(t· 
on Apr i 1 2 2, 1966, be fore the Honorable A \\'·' 
Ellett, then one of the judges of the Thi~al 
District, sitting by invitation in the sc' .. br 
Judicial District. Both defendants were f.~c 
by the jury by verdicts signed April 23, icNc: 
the crime of robbery as charged in the inf.~ 
Defendant Chestnut was sentenced to be co 11 :0f 
the Utu.h State Prison for an indetE:::rminateP0 
of time, not less than five years, no moHbr 
(i~ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
' Q\1 
Appellant Chestnut seeks a new trial. ar 
\\'fl 
STATEMENT OF FACTS pc 
ra 
re The key witnesses produced by the StatEITh 
trial of this matter were Leonard K. Jewke:1 
William J. Himes, Jr., both patrolmen with :In~ 
High~a:( Pa~rc~}, (Tr: 9,,9 an? ~301: . Trc;oper Jd~h 
testified tha~ on the evening ?f October 8,!fe 
and Trooper Himes were patrolling Interstc1t'of 
Crescent Junction. The officers observed 01 11 
mobile, traveling in the opposite direction,1~c 
failed to dim its lights for a car immediat:i'te 
front of the patrol car (Tr 100). The p~tr:,ge 
turned and followed the car and clocked it 0 li 
of 88 miles per hour, the posted speed lirndac 
70 miles per hour (Tr 101). The troopers s}c 
au~omobile- (Tr·l.Olh·and the:driv~r·or thelar 




, , ' J 0 ? ) . The o f f j cc rs a c1 rn i n i s t c r c cl a f i e 1 cl 
fc t· 1 fC:r. c1E:-tcrminj ng wl:cther or not the clrivcr 
A. 1-;. 1:. clr J_ving undc:=:r lhe inf] u0ncc of intoxicating 
i 1 a 1 cc: l 1 CJ 1 , as a 1 coho 1 was s rn c 110 c1 on tl 1 e d r i v c r • s 
e,.brcCtth ('l'r 102). At this point Officer liirncs 
H;Nrdwcl the interior of t~1c cc:r, ancl Defenclanl 
1,Nc11ton, who had been sleeping in the back seLit, 
nf;av:olJ' (Tr. 103). In searcl1ing t~e automobile, 
oti'Off i ccr Himes found a revol vcr in lhc glove corn-
l pur tnwnt. Defenc1ant ChPstnut stated that lhc gun 
r:belo11yC'c1 to hir:1 (Tr 103). In addition, the trunk 
0 ~ U1c2 automobile was searched and the officers 
fo11nc1 three six-packs of beer and an Air Force 
0 ,,rrni ght bag. The defendants were placed under 
arrc:;l (rrr 136), and defendant Chestnut procJucecl 
whcd appeared to be a . 25 caliber automatic pistol, 
~inted it at the officers, and demanded that they 
raise their hands (Tr 137, 138). Defendant Newton 
t 
1
rrlievec1 the officers of their side arms ('l'r J 08). 
~~~e officers were directed to go to a fence on the 
:~:.1 north side of the highway, and Mr. Newton fired a 
-.,;shot in front of them as they were walking tm·1ard 
~'lthe fence (Tr 110). When the officers reu.ched the 
_ ;.1fence, Defendant Chestnut took the wallet of 
]'1;.: 1 0ffict~r Jewkes while st~ll holding the small revolver 
. ·(Tr 110, 111). The officers were then handcuffed 
LO~,~to u telephone pole (Tr 113, 114). Officer Jewkes 
12
''•testi fied that his wa 11 et contained $118. 00, to--
it!:,get her with some personal papers and driver's 
t '.license (Tr 116). The foregoing actions were 
_nn
1
;.laccornpu.nied with various threats and epithets 
; 
5
'accorc1ing to the testimony of Patrolmen Jewkes 
ie and Himes. The evidence also illustrates thct 
;tn'
1
the • 25 caliber pistol wielded by Defendant · 
\Chestnut was loaded (Tr 180, 181). 
-4-
The defendants fled the scene in their 
automobile and after a transfer of vehicle 
taking shelter in a truck, were apprehendr: ir. 
the police (Tr 172). When the defendLJ.nts lh 
apprehended, the service revolvers ~ere fuch 
in their possession (Tr 175). Officer Je1,.wc 
· a'i 
wallet was eventually found in the abCl.ndor1 ' 
'• t11 
of the defendants (Tr 189). Only $8.00 of 0 
$118. 00 in the wallet was missing. "' 
The dcfendants·requested, at the concl 
t11e tria.l, that the trial court instruct~ 
'di th re:.opect to the offenses of simple as0 
and obstruction of u public officer in th0 
foc111-c,11''' duty. (See defendants' re: 
in:c;l . ·· t11bers 3, 4, and 5.) Before, 
j u1_·y rel= ired, the Court wus in formed of the 
defendants' exceptions to its failure to g: 
these instructions (Tr 205 and 206). And,, 
the jury had retired, further exceptions~ 
taken by both defendants with respect to )J( 
Court's failure to give instructions on tk1wJ 
lesser or included offenses (Tr 209 and 2ir: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT.I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO G1( 
THE DEFENDl\NrS I REQUESTED INSTRuCTIONS l 
ON LESSER AND INCLUDED OFFENSESo 0 
,') 
It is the position of defendant Chcstrn'·:. 
the trial court erred prejudicially in fa1Lf1 
give the requested instructions with res peel 3 
the crime of assault. 
-5-
~ir If the evidence given by the Highway Patrol-
L ir 11 wcrP believed in this case, it seems clear 
d 'h ff. . . cthat f ere was su- icient evidence to support a 
s chdrg<? of sim.J?le a~sault, or assault with a deadly 
fo 1.;capon as defined in Utah Code Annotated, §§ 76-7-1 
ei:ancl 76-7-6, respectively. As has been stated by 
0rtlns court in State vs. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P. 
Of !ri 1130 (1937): 
cl 
L 
"It is too elemental to require argu-
ment, that to point a loaded revolver at 
another to frighten or wound him consti-
1-utes an assault; that a loaded revolver 
is a deadly weapon; and that shooting at 
another to wound him is with intent to do 
bodily harm, unless those things were done 
under conditions and circumstances which 
j us ti fied the acts in the eyes of the law." 
The starting point 
t:,:;2 UL1h Code Annotated, 
which provides: 
for further analysis must 
Section 77-33-6 (1953) 
'.ll 1 
ff 
"The jury may find the defendant guilty 
of any offense, the commission of which 
is necessarily included in that with which 
he is charged in the indictment or informa-
tion, or of an attempt to commit the offense." 
S !he first question, there fore, is whether assault, 
Jt assault with a deadly weapon, are included 
, )f fens es within the crime of robbery as defined 
n1;,:n Utci.h Code Annotated, Section 76-51-1 (1953). 
iLf~~er-c--a-re cases which have held that assault with 
eel 1 deadly weapon may be included within the charge 
1
Jf robbery. See, People v. Driscol, 128 P.2d 382 
-6-
(Dist. Ct. App., Cal. 1942). This, hOWC'vc
1 
: 
would seem somewhat questionable, inasmuc]
1 
~ 
robbery, as de fined, need not take place vii: I 
a deadly weapon. Ra thcr, it is only reqniu 
that personal property be taken from thC' ~~ 
session of another "against his will, accorr. 
pl ished by means of force or fear." One cc 
ima9inc instances where this could be acc 01 ._L 
plish0cl without the use of deadly weapons. i 
However, the case l.aw seems clear to the cf.C 
that a simple assault is included within tr t 
offense of robbery. See People v .___KQ_s~, 25' l 
Pac. 123 (Dist. ct. App. I Cal. 1927) I wher0 \\ 
the Court pointed out: 
"It follows that the offense of 'u 
simple assault is also included with- w 
in robbery, and the Court erred in r 
refusing to give instructions requesteci s 
on this point." !o' 
1h1 
Additional support for this propositionj'7 
contained in State v. Vance, 39 Utah 602, E7' 
Pac. 309 ( 1911) , where the Court noted: aj 
vr-
"We think that all of the authoritie:l 11 
agree that where violence is a necessar}1 
ingredient in committing the offense, a:,.ut 
is contained in the charge of murder, 
then the lesser offense, namely, an ass:I t 
with intent to murder, is necessarily l!S 
. . 1 h th' rE included in the pr1nc1pa c arge - - 'u 
of murder." irE 
,16 l 
rt follows, that since the use of force or l•~ 




sii111,1c assault is a necessarily included offense 
~·Ji s;nce it is "an unlawful attempt coupled with a 
vii prt.:'.;cn l abi 1 it y to commit iJ. v iolcn t injury on the 
iir.per:;on of another". U~~l:l_co_CI~ Annotates-~, section 
p8 /b-- 7- 1 ( 19 5 3) . 
~Oil.· 
Cc This background, pl us the fctct that it is 
~ 01 .. undi. o:;pu t~ d in the record that a rcqucc:_; t for cin 
0 in~,tructJon on SJmpl8 assault was made on bch0Jf ~£.Of Appellant ancl refused by the trial court, raises 
tr the interesting questions under the law of Utah as 
2,, lo wliether this cons tit u tecJ error, ancJ if so, j • 
~r 0 1\]10tl1cr it was prejudicial. 
As an initial proposition, several leading 
'utcth cases must be distinguishccl since they deal 
with the situation where the defendant did not 
request an instruction on an incl ucled offense. Jn 
.eci such an instance, this court has held on several 
1occasions that the defendant cannot normally be 
\~ard lo complain on appeal. Sec State v. SuJlivan, 
onl'73 Utah 582, 276 Pac. 166 (1929), sta-tc_v:--Fc-r5]l_1-s~c2~1]~, 
1,74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 (1929). However, there 
·:are some Utah cases which charge the trial court 
~th the responsibility of instructing the jury on 
ie:lincluded offenses even though no request is made 
aG~rrefor by the defendant. See State v. Cobo, 90 
a::.Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952 (1936). 
5~ The instant case~ pf necessity, is a much 
1stronger one than these inasmuch as there was a 
wlrequest for the instructions ":'hi~h .was der:ied ~y 
~e trial court. A case of significance in this 
\regard is State v. Mitchell, 3 U. 2d.70, 278 _P. 2d 
,,618 (1955). The question on appeal in that case ~;~s whether the trial court erred in failing to 
~ i 
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instruct on voluntary m,-=i.nslaughter in a f; 
degree murder case. T11ere \\'as no requc~st 
such an instruction at the trial level. 11 
holding that voluntary m2nslaughter is not~1 
essarily included in first degree murdet", i1 
Court, in a narrow holding, stated that f~~ 
to give the instruction \\'<3.S \vi thin the tris1 
court's discretion specifically \vhere "inn:i 
t ions are _Q_ot requested ~~1:i._g__~~.9.!= __ 9j_- ven". 
1 (Ernphasis original) Of interest, however, 
the concurring opi~ion of Justice Crockett( 
\vherein he stated: n 
"It is elementary that it is the 
duty of the Court to present to the 1 
jury a s tu tement of the elements of g1 
the offense charged; and that '... t. 
1.v here the accused i s ch a r g e d with a c 
gr cater offense, he is nevertheless " 
entitled to an instruction that the t 
jury may convict him of a lesser of- ~ 
fense if included 1;;ithin the greater . . Y 
il 
In §tate v. Brennan, 13 U. 2d 195, 371 r: 
27 (1962), the State complained of the tric 
court's failure to instruct on the lesser 'I 
of fens G of driving while intoxicated in a c.~. 
cution for reckless driving. The court c 1~1 
and in so doing stated: 
"In view of the fact that evidence 
of intoxication recited above obviouslyj 
would have been sufficient to pr~ve . 1 
a prima facie case of driving while ln-, 
toxicated, we are unable to preceive 
why the trial cou.r t did not submit the I 
case to the jury on that included of- 1 
fense. In refusing the State's request1 
-9-
fi 1-0 do so it committed error against 
t Lhe State." 
[\ 
JUertdinly the converse of this situation is true 
, in that the defendant also is entitled to instruc-
faJions on lesser included offensos and failure to do 
~i,so, when requested, constitutes error on the part 
13,0 j Lhc trial court. 
, _?_l~;-1te v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 
:t (i029) as stated, is distinguishable inasmuch as 
~ request was there made for instruction on the 
lesser included offense. However, c0rtain observa-
t1<)11:) mdde by Justice Straup in his concurring opin-
~re of significance. His analysis of this 
~ner0l problem is one of the more thoroughgoing 
to be found on this subject. With considerable 
e1:1[lhnsis on the defendant's right to a jury trial, 
dless of the overwhelming nature of the 
c .. 'iJcnce of his guilt, Justice Straup concludes 
(tLc-1.l there is an almost absolute duty on the pa.rt 
jof Lhe trial court to instruct with regard to 
il2:sser offenses even where not requested. His 
oning is persuasive: 
11 .. ! 
"Where, therefore, the essentials of 
the charged greater offense embrace and 
include every essential of the lesser 
offense, and where the evidence is suf-
ficient to support the charged greater 
offense, I think it follows, as does 
night the day, that of necessity there 
is also sufficient evidence to support 
a conviction of the lesser offense. In 
such case I think it the duty of the court 
to submit to the jury the whole issue as 
presented by the indictment or information 
~nd not merely a part of it, and that the 
-10-
courl oug11L noL so subrni l lhe cci.sc 
as to compel or coc-rcc the jury to 
fj nd t11c a.ccusccl guilty of the grcJLc:r 
o f I en~; e , or f j n d hi rn not g u i 1 t y , or s 0 
as to give the jury no altcnEitivc or 
djscrcljon, except to do the one or th 0 
·'' 
o l h c r . Wh er c , uncle r s u ch con cli t ions , ,;, 
I\: 
only the grcci.ter charged offense is 
sul)tni '·: cd, jurors, or some of them, I l 
h<1 \' j n~J a re0sonable cloubt as to the cxL-
l :1cc c< all of the essential elements 
of the charged grealer offense, are rc-
qt1 ire cl or induced to find lhe accused 
I1l>l: gu·ilty, when, had the Jesser offenc;L 
aJ~;o been submitted, might convict hirn 
of the lesser offense, while on the otlK. ·. 
hzrncl, a jury somev-7hat loath on tl1e evi--
dcncc to wholly acqnjt the accused may 
be j1iclucec1 or influenced to find him 1·: 
guilty of the greater offense, when, if ~-
the J c;sser offense also is submiltccl, i• 
rnay find him guilty only of thal offen~:r .. · 
rJ'hus, under the condi Lions stated I 
thin1~ it the duty of the court to submit ;. 
bolh the greater and the lesser offense I; 
to tlJC? jury and to charge the pr incipJ es r_'. 
of J 0 'W applicable thereto, whether re- l 
queslcd so to do or not. I see no basis 
for the assertion that the court is re-
quirC?d to charge the jury the general t 
princj pl es of law applicable to the .. 
charged greater offense whether requestec ~ 
or not, but is not required to charge the l 
general principles of law applicable to 
the charged lesser offense unless re-
quested so to do." l ,. 
i 
-11-
1r1 _sLa~~-y. __ ]Iy_<1_n~::;, 6t1 Ul<i11 /.(:CJ, 130 Pde. 31'.9 
'!) ckfcnc=;c ceiunsC'l at t11c lri;:l] n·c111o:;lccl thol 
1, ,·,H1rL instruct wit11 regai~cl tu the c:ci_r1 1c1 of 
I<· ;1:-;sault, lhc clcfcnc1;c1nl h21ving }icc·n cl1zirc1r cl 
l l 1 c g-r cu. l c r off en co c of ci s ;::_; .~ ult \v j t h j n t c 11 ( l 0 
1:. i L r al 1 c . Th c court , not in CJ l ha t j l i :::; n 0 t a J _ 
1,, 1cvcrsiblc error to fail lo give jn~;lruclions 
1·1( :::J'r inc] uclccl offcn:;cs, continnr'cl: 
"It is, however, always a dc•l:icatc 
[ll,:-:ttcr for a trial court lo viitJ·ihoJ cl 
fro rn th c j u r y th c r i g ht to f :i n cl th c 
Cl cc u ::; c d g u i 1 t y o f a 1 c s ~; c r o i n c ] u (le cl 
L' ff c n s e , an cJ cJ c t 12 r rn inc th c CJ L' ,- : i c , 1 o f 
tlic state of th0 cvicle11ce a:; a rnc-1tt er 
c1[ law. That should be done only in very 
c 1 c 21 r ca s c s . " 
le Court went on to hold that J_n that cdsc it w0::; 
1· rs i 1 J J c c r r or for t 11 c co u r t t o r c f u :: o l o i n s t r u c L , 
I; 1\;uc~:::; tcd, on a less er inc 1 uclccl off c n:; c. 
Likewise, in _§_t:_a~_'!___.__J?~J.:-:_~<:~s_, 91 Utah 574, 65 
,. 113 0 ( 1 9 3 7 ) th i s court h cl cl th" 1 t i t w e:i s rev c r -
1~ C" e:rror I in CT prosecution for (-lc;c;(lull with 
L;1t Lo do bodily harm, to fail lo i1i:,truct on 
li1i1t1c of simple assault. 
In People~_._<;;_'_armen, 228 P.2d 281 (Cal, 1951) 
r ~ourt slated that regardl~ss ,..of how wec1k the ---rice may be on the lesser ofrcnse, the Court 
c h duty to instruct concerning it. Pe_~le v. L 2S9 Pac. 123 (Cal, 1927) is directly in point. 
t ~~1urt there held that it was error to refuse 




The u_ u tho r i t i c s ~3 c C' rn to ,l. c3 r cc th zt t tlw 
t ion s on the l c s ;3 er i n c l u cl c c1 o f f ,, n ;3 c n c (~ d 
\vhcrc there is at lcust some r~vidcncc \v}1 i.-· · 
support a. conviction thereon. This is in·: 
with the gcnc-ru_l rule:; regarding instructi.u~ 
ever, it is difficult inclcec1 L~o imagine ,1, 
there is sufficient evidence to go to the 
i_-e;~pcct to the grecl.ter offense C\nd yet no 
to go to the jury with respect to a le:3sc•r 
cssCJ.Li ly included offense. As :3tu_ted by ,J, 
SL1rup in -~-~u_te __ y~£e1~g_us_s")_l_l_, _::;1:_1_pra: 
"As a general rule - - there may lw 
c~xc,~ptions to it - - where thcore is suf 
fi_cicnt evidence to justify a convict1.: 
of the~ ch0rged greater offense of nec-
r~:~:-:;ity, there also is sufficient evj_cJ,,1, 
l:o justify a convict ion of the neccs::;.111 
inc.luclcJ l0ssc:r of:'fcnsc whc~n all of l:h~1 
( · :; ·; '; ,1 l: ia l ::> of the le~:; ser arc ernb1·accd 
i nclnck;d i.n the <JCCater." 
This i::o onl~ cons is tent with the cl~ f C'ndanl' 'l 
•- UJllt Lo a Jury on each ancJ every issue pr· 
1 
the; c-:vick~ncc. Following the reasoning of •·I 
Sl:r.<1up, \·Jc \vould point out that rcgardlc::ss I 
ovr.::-l.-<./hc lmi ng l~hc evidence is with respect 1-I 
c_Ju i_ 1 t of a def i:::-:-ndz:tn t on the gr cater of fcnse i 
the j rn.-y inn y non co Lhe le:3 s, with absolute irnp.;1 
rcLurn a vc:cdict of not guilty. In crirnina 
Lhcrc is no mandate for the trial judge to -
'·/<...1y prcc'rnpt the ultimate and conclusive po«\: 
U1c jm.-y to determine guilt or innocence. 
~:;o, it can be said in all cases that there r 
~~ibi.lity thd.t the defendant will not be f0c;' 
of l:hc 9rcatcr offense. To do justice to L'. 
s t0 te and t·he de fcnclant, there fore, it is 1 
l:ha t the jury h;:ivc be fore it al 1 possible "-
.j 
-13-
I 11cli ng lc:3ser included offenses. l\s Justice 
· 111p noted: 
"If in a case of cJi f ferent degrees 
of the charged greater offense there 
is sufficient evidence to submit the 
c:i1'.3e to the jury of the charged greater 
offense, I do not sec w11ercin it is the 
prerogative of the court to direct the 
jury of what degree only the jury may 
find the defendant guilty, or to direct 
lhc;rn that, if they clo not find him 
c_r11ilt:y of the charged greater o J:fcnsc 
lhey rnusl:. acquit him. To permiL: the 
Court to do that is to permit il~ to be 
lhc:; j uclgc:: of the f0cts. If the Court 
l:ur such purposes may so consider u.nd 
Wi1ive the evidence and find the f0cts 
Jnd thus so determine the dc:grec::, I :.;ee 
no reason why the Court, in a c0~c where 
l hc evidence is conclw:>ively u.nd indis-
putably shmvs the defendant's guilt of 
the char0ed 9rea ter offense, whc~re the·ce 
i:; no rule or basis Gither in lu.1v or in 
fJct for any doubt whatever, may not 
equally direct a verdict of guilt. It 
is apparent that the court may not do 
Pi_ the r, for under the Con!:3 tit u lion n.nd 
the ::;tatute making the jury the :;ole 
j udgcs of the facts they may render ;:my 
kind of verdict with respect to any 
offense presented by and inclucled 1,;il-hin 
the inc1icl:.mcnt or information." 
To further probe the prejudicial nature of 
:· · .'1il1ire to instruct on lesser included offenses, 
.. is only necessat-y to refer to elemental ix;ych-
: 'Jyy. In a case such as the instant case, or 
-14-
in rn'1ny crirninc.il CCl~)C'S fo1- th0l rn<1llcr, jt 1 
-. . ' l l 1w l h c 1 l the d c f c n cb n t ~; ha v 0 con c1 u ct e:: cl l 
scl\'C'f; :;ornc\,:h0t irnpropc'rly. 'l'hc ncltur<'l rr, 
of the jury, faced wj_th such a situai.~ion, \,,. 
1 
•• 
to pu11i .. 11 t11e accu~-;ed. IIowcver, when an in~'.­
is g j vc:11 only on the g rea tcr offense, with t 
aJ t,•rn<i « ivc being acquital, the natural tc11l 
UJc jui-y m<.1y be to find the dr:::fc-'ncla.nt guiJ t 
though he _i ;:; not in fact gui 1 t y of the grc;1t 
in <1Jl respects. T11us, the jury should b0 c, 
otlwr indicated alternatives includinQ le:;:,·· 
offc11:.. .. . It may be properly surmised, givi 
credit i.o our jurors, that if the cvid0nc0 i. 
suppn - Ls a conviction of the greater of fen'<i 
convjct:ion V.'ill be forthcom:ing. IJowever, c;.
1 
protection is found in the case where the C\' j 
with ·. C'<Jcffcl to the greater offense may be qucj 
ab}. ,_,- the su})jcct of a reasonable doubt ir! I 
ca~;c· i. }11~ jury, if the elements are found, rn~~.1 
vic:t C>f a lcssc~r included offense. This ber 
t11e f; i. ct l c· zu::; wel 1 as the def en de.int. \ 
T11c fo~cgoing discussion i~ not con~incc: ·1 
the acaclcunc. There are practical cons 1 derac. 
the insi;c 0 nt case which may well have been F' 
on tiJc innocence of the appellant with respcx 
the crime of robbery. '11 his \\1as not a cuse ·\'. 
the accused calculated and pJz~nned a bc:rnJ~ nll 
a slron0-ilrm holdup on the slreet. Rather, t 
robbery, if indeed any there was, occurred af 
result of precipitating actions on the part c' 
police officers. It might well have been ar0 
at trial that at the time of taking of the ~ 
men's guns, the intent was not to deprive the ( 
owner of his possession thereof, on a permJD: · 
basis, but merely to disarm the policemen. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore,: 
-15-
: , 1 \I l: ,1 h l LJ. w l h c tr i u. 1 court c r r c c1 pr c j u c1 i -
, l l ~r i n f Cl i l in g to i n s t r u c t th c j u r y , as 
, 1 r::~l.ccl, on the crime of simple a:3snult which 
1 •. , t 11 , ·ct~~~ sari 1 y incl udcd wi t~hi n the CJ rcci tc c off cnse 
: i 1 llbbcry. 
Respectfully submitted 
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